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Abstract 
So long as there is law there can be no universal human right to peace. 
This is because legalized violence, whether in threat or in deed, constitutes 
the very antithesis of peaceful relations from the point of view of those 
whom law represses. Law cannot define peace as the absence of all 
violence—and still less as the absence of all legalized suffering—without 
gainsaying justice, for as Pascal says, “Justice without might is helpless; 
might without justice is tyrannical.” Although legal outcomes, like falling 
boulders and pouncing lions, can always be imputed to historical causes, 
experience teaches that legal actors generally seek to legitimate their deeds 
by grounding the law in some non-causal narrative of the right or the good. 
According to a tenet of political liberalism that can be traced to Descartes’ 
discovery 8or invention< of the irreducible “I” that thinks, the legitimacy of 
law’s narrative is both given and taken by free and rational politico-legal 
subjects. 
In truth, however, the Western philosophical tradition gives us two 
separate grammars for discussing what it takes to be two different kinds of 
rational subjects: the causal subject and the grounding subject. The causal 
subject stands in a relation to the world. Acting strategically as the cause of 
effects, it uses the object world and other human beings as means to its ends. 
But the causal subject is also itself caused: its desires and actions are effects 
of history in the largest sense of the word. Such a one is fated by grammar 
and custom to become an object and a means in its own right: an object for 
scientific inquiry and knowledge, for example, and, more generally, a means 
to the ends of other causal subjects. From the standpoint of the causal 
subject, there can be no human right not to use or be used as a means. 
Unlike the causal subject, the grounding subject is supposed to be a 
genuine origin rather than a mere link in an infinite chain of causes and 
effects. In Greek terms, this subject is an archē as opposed to an aitia. It also 
corresponds to the original Latin meaning of the word “sub-ject”: it is 
thrown 8jacere< under 8sub< its world as 8not in< an unmediated relation to 
its projects. This second kind of subject has gone by many different names, 
including “soul” 8Plato<, “freedom” 8Kant< and “Spirit” 8Hegel<. In one way or 
another, the idea of the grounding subject performs its primary task within 
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the moral sphere: it is supposed to provide a secure foundation which 
explains how it is possible for its doppelganger, the causal subject, at once to 
accomplish something in the world and to refute Plautus’s notorious 
argument that man is wolf to man. If the causal subject reacts in the manner 
of an animal, then the grounding subject allegedly responds in the manner of 
an animal rationale. If the causal subject produces effects, then the 
grounding subject is supposed to create and bear responsibility for those 
effects. 
Given the foregoing distinctions, the most pressing juridical and moral 
question facing twenty-first century humanity seems to be: How can law and 
politics become at once effective and just, coercive and compassionate, 
responsive and responsible? How, in short, is it possible 8to borrow Kant’s 
somewhat quaint terminology< to use oneself and other human beings 
simultaneously as ends and as means? But here, as elsewhere in philosophy, 
appearances can be deceiving, for this question presupposes far too much. 
This paper investigates the strong connection between the foregoing 
concepts of subjectivity and the notion of a just peace. The question is not, 
“Are there rational subjects and can they found something new, such as a 
just peace?” Instead, the question at the heart of the matter is how 
something as flimsy and ephemeral as an “idea” could ever found anything at 
all. I will attempt to unmask the terrible tensions or contradictions between 
justice and ethics, freedom and responsibility, and reason and compassion, 
and trace them to their origin: the will 8or desire< to deny tragedy. I claim 
that the concept of the grounding subject represents a desperate and 
ultimately futile attempt to repress awareness of 8and evade personal 
responsibility for< the essential sadness and tragedy of the world. Reason 
and faith provide the human body with a thin tissue of grounding statements 
comprised of symbols and images. At best these symbols and images are 
mere stimuli: action-triggers that will never adequately span the vast 
existential distance separating the grounding subject from the causal subject, 
our ends from our means, our words from our deeds, and, more generally, 
human suffering from the endless secular and religious casuistries we offer 
to justify it. 
Keywords: Peace; Universal Human Right; Law; Philosophical Tradition; 
Subjectivity. 
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1. Introdution 
So long as there is law there can be no universal human right to 
peace. This is because legalized violence, whether in threat or in 
deed, constitutes the very antithesis of peaceful relations from the 
point of view of those whom law represses. Law cannot define peace 
as the absence of all violence—and still less as the absence of all 
legalized suffering—without gainsaying justice, for as Pascal says, 
“Justice without might is helpless; might without justice is 
tyrannical.” 8Pascal, 1941: 103<  Although legal outcomes, like falling 
boulders and pouncing lions, can always be imputed to historical 
causes, experience teaches that legal actors generally seek to 
legitimate their deeds by grounding the law in some non-causal 
narrative of the right or the good.  
It has been said that ours is “the epoch of the subject,” in the precise 
sense that for us the idea of the Individual Human Being has replaced 
both the Nature of the ancients and the God of medieval Christianity 
as the “new ground of being and meaning.” 8Douzinas, 2000: 84, 93< 
Nowhere is this shifting of the ground more visible than in the notion 
of a legal entitlement, including especially “human rights,” where the 
classical Western declarations all say that the rights they specify 
belong to an entity called “Man.” Conceived of secularly as a “pivot of 
self-consciousness”, 8Kojéve, 1980: 86< this human subject is 
supposed to employ what the Greeks called logos, or discourse 
endowed with a meaning, to give and take grounds for itself in the 
form of THE LAW. 
Of course, the linkage between subjectivity and the concept of 
ground is a well known feature of Western intellectual history. Less 
visible, however, is the connection between the idea of subject-as-
ground and the phenomenon of ethical evasion during the un-
peaceful moment in which some individuals threaten or apply 
“legitimate” legal force against other individuals. The relationship 
between grounding and ethical evasion is difficult to see because 
ever since Kant’s day we have been taught to believe that “being 
principled”—i.e. acting on the basis of textual grounds as opposed 
to yielding to merely causal influences—constitutes the very 
essence of being ethical. On this view, if the law of the land happens 
to be just, then willing disobedience to the law is the same as willing 
disobedience to the moral law, and those in charge of the legal 
system are duty-bound to inflict pain on the transgressor regardless 
of any “irrational” feelings of pity or compassion they may 
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experience on his account.1 
Nevertheless, Walter Benjamin rightly observed that “something 
rotten in law” 8etwas Morsches im Recht< 81978, 286< is revealed 
whenever human beings believe that they legitimately and even justly 
exercise the power over life and death in the law’s name, as they may 
do, for example, when they administer the death penalty, sentence 
convicted criminals to understaffed and underfunded prisons, enforce 
military conscription in wartime, or even evict defaulting tenants onto 
the mean streets of the city. It will be the task of this essay to enlarge 
and refocus Benjamin’s point. I will try to uncover something 
analogous to rottenness 8a deep sadness, perhaps< in the relationship 
between the belief that well-grounded action is possible and the 
phenomenon of legal violence. In addition to whatever else the law 
may accomplish, I will claim that at the end of the day it represents the 
will to deny what Max Weber has called the “tragedy with which all 
action, but especially political action, is truly interwoven.” 8Weber, 
1958: 117< 
2. 
The story of how the idea of ground passed from nature to God, and 
thence to the modern human subject, usually begins with Aristotle. The 
Philosopher 8as Aquinas called him< employed the Greek term to 
hypokeimenon 8literally, “that-which-lies-under”< to denote a given 
thing’s essence or substance. This he placed in opposition to the thing’s 
merely accidental “qualities,” such as its particular color or size. The 
hypokeimenon of any given being, X, is what provides X its unity through 
time, and therefore what founds and supports its ultimate purpose 
8telos<, defined as that which each being inherently strives to become 
8i.e. its entelecheia< 8192a25-34<. Hypokeimenon is what makes each 
and every X 8including human beings< what they are “in virtue of 
being themselves” 81028b33-1030b14<. 
For Aristotle, as for the Greeks in general, constancy was the 
unshakeable ground for the possibility of something “accidental”.2 
The merely accidental qualities of X transpire in the sphere of what 
holds as constant or as a rule for X: namely, in the sphere of nature. 
Nature 8physis< in the Greek sense was not conceived of as 
something that had to be created by anything outside of itself. In 
contemplating nature 8including human nature<, the Greeks 
discovered what they took to be an eternal “world-order” which 
served as their principle of comprehension and evaluation of all 
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things.1 In a nutshell, the Greeks, and later the Romans, were inclined 
to look “outward”—to what they took to be nature itself—as the 
measure and stable ground 8hypokeimenon< of all of nature’s beings, 
including even the gods themselves. 
The proper home for the concept of ground in Western thought 
shifted place with the advent of Christianity. Plato, in the Timaeus 
828b1-29d3<, had argued that the chaotic substance of the universe 
was first given shape by a demiurge, or creator. But this ur-being did 
not make the world ex nihilo, for as Timaeus says in the dialogue, 
nothing can come from nothing. Instead, the demiurge bestowed order 
upon the substance of the universe by imitating that which is eternal 
and unchanging, namely, the self-showing appearance 8eidos< of the 
everlasting world of forms 8Plato’s idéas<. Attempting to wed the 
authority of Holy Scripture to the philosophical authority of Plato, early 
and medieval Christian thinkers radically upgraded the role of the 
creator and downgraded the idéas to the status of mere creations. 
These thinkers interpreted nature as an utterly created thing 8ens 
creatum<, from top to bottom, and made God-the-creator into the 
omnipotent and ultimate ground of everything that is, including 
nature-as-a-whole and all of the beings, both real and ideal, that inhabit 
it. 
In particular, the medieval schoolmen, following Aquinas 8Summa 
Theologica, I q. 1 a. 7<, translated the word hypokeimenon as 
subjectum 8literally, “that-which-is-thrown-under”<, which they 
placed in opposition to the term objectum 8literally, “that-which-is-
thrown-in-the-way-of”<. For them, a subjectum was something that is 
capable of being thought about or acted upon independently of our 
knowledge or even our existence; whereas an objectum was that 
which is concretely experienced of something by a human agent 
through this or that power or faculty of perception. The medieval 
sense of the difference between the subjective and the objective was 
thus the exact opposite of modern usage. For Aquinas and the 
schoolmen, the objective was merely that which is thrown-in-the-
way-of a human perception, whereas the subjective was what we 
would today call the “subject matter” itself: namely, reality, and most 
especially reality’s God, to whom all things refer, as Aquinas said, “as 
their beginning and end.” 
Now a truly comprehensive explanation of the rise of the modern 
subject would have to take account of much of the rich intellectual, 
cultural and political history that transpired between the thirteenth 
and seventeenth centuries. In the interest of space, however, I will 
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simply observe that René Descartes is usually credited with having 
definitively initiated the so-called “subjective turn” in Western 
philosophy. His cogito ergo sum redirected thought’s gaze, so to speak, 
from “outward” to “inward,” namely, to the thinking thing that is 
certain of itself 8res cogitans qua certum<. The I that thinks 8ego 
cogito< became for Descartes and his intellectual descendents “the first 
principle of philosophy,” 8Descartes, 1985: i. 127< the one being that is 
more in being than any other being. 
Kant’s subsequent “Copernican revolution” 8Kant, 1998: 110< in 
philosophy gave the human subject a systematic form that did not need 
to be derived from any authority beyond its own capacity for rigorous 
self-awareness.  Descartes’ thinking thing grew into the new subjectum 
and ground of everything that is, or rather, of everything that can be 
thought about or experienced by human beings. In the guise of pure 
reason, Kant’s transcendental subject became a fixed and abiding self 
hardwired with “forms of intuition,” “faculties” and “categories” that 
allowed it to organize and make sense of its experiences. Its unity 
secured, the self-certain human subject displaced God and nature as 
the ultimate foundation of all possible knowledge and truth, and in this 
sense became the creator of its own reality. 
Enlightenment, defined by Kant as “man’s leaving his self-caused 
immaturity, [that is,J the incapacity to use one’s intelligence without 
the guidance of another,” 8Kant, 1993: 145< became an individual 
moral imperative. Indeed, the very concept of enlightenment 
implicitly denounced the medieval notion that individuals should 
submit without question or hesitation 8i.e. without reason< to 
traditional sources of authority within a hierarchical social order that 
pretended to be God-given and eternal. With the appearance of Kant’s 
finite human subjectum, the entity “Man” no longer needed a pastor 
or holy book to supply him with a conscience, as Kant himself would 
declare.1 The human subject was therefore poised to step into the 
shoes that hitherto had been occupied by the infinite and divine 
Thomistic subjectum. 
In the guise of practical reason, Kant’s newly minted transcendental 
subject was identified with freedom, defined as the will’s capacity to 
lay down the law for itself in accordance with the moral law. This 
moral law was the categorical imperative: “Act as if the maxim of your 
action were to become by your will a general law of nature.” 8Kant 
1993, 187< In one of the boldest finesse plays 8or category mistakes< in 
the history of philosophy, Kant accepted the categorical imperative as a 
“fact” of reason, the absolute truth of which is accessible to the internal 
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gaze of all rational subjects. After Kant, the entity “Man” morphed into 
a self-enclosed rational monad: a being that could, at long last, “free 
himself from obligation to Christian revelational truth and Church 
doctrine to a legislating for himself that takes its stand upon itself.” 
8Heidegger, 1977: 148< 
In legal positivism, which remains to this day thoroughly Kantian in 
spirit despite all that has happened in and to humanity during the past 
two hundred years, the one who posits the law can no longer be 
confused with nature or God. Whether in the form of a monarch, a 
legislator, a dictator, a ruling junta, or even the fictional “We the 
people” of the United States Constitution, the one who posits the law—
and the one who can un-posit it—has finally come out from behind the 
curtain. The one who is at once “free” to posit the law and “bound” to 
follow it can no longer hide or deny the fact that he or she is a “human, 
all too human” being. 
3. 
The categorical imperative stipulates that moral content 8“maxims of 
action”< should be generated, but it is itself devoid of any particular 
moral content. The universality of the imperative is therefore utterly 
procedural, the only constraint on its concrete application being the 
formal requirement of non-contradiction. Because of its purely 
abstract universality, Hegel would soon claim that Kant’s “universal 
moral law” can just as easily become a principle of immorality as a 
principle of morality. Long before postmodern thought and its so-
called “indeterminacy thesis,” it was Hegel who first drew attention to 
the radical insecurity of the temporal passage between grounds and 
grounded in the Kantian system. “‘It is only a blunder, an incompetence 
of reason,’” observed Hegel, “if one can show it incapable of justifying 
by this principle any determination and therefore any action at all.” 
8Hyppolite, 1996: 47< 
In identifying the rational with the real, and the true with the whole 
of reality, Hegel dragged Kant’s abstract, transcendental subject into 
time and history in the form of Spirit 8Geist<, and he equated world 
history with the continuous Sisyphean labors of human beings to 
negate the given through concrete work aimed at actualizing their 
ideas.1 In the assertion that “the power of Spirit is only as great as its 
expression, its depth only as deep as it dares to spread out and lose 
itself in its expression,” 8Hegel, 1977: 6< the creative logos of John 1:1 
finally lost its supernatural deistic provenance and assumed a 
completely human, historicized form. 
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The Hegelian philosophical system remained mere speculative 
metaphysics, of interest primarily to philosophers and dreamers, until 
Marx radically transformed Hegel’s critique of Kant’s abstract moral 
casuistry into a comprehensive political critique of concrete social life. 
According to Marx all moral law-giving of the type that Kant and his 
intellectual heirs advocated was not only hopelessly abstract1, as Hegel 
had said, but also an epiphenomenon, that is, causally linked to the 
promotion of particular social 8i.e. class< interests. In the thesis that 
“man is the supreme being for man,” and that the religious, moral and 
legal ideas of an era are but ideological reflections of the oppressive 
social relations prevailing during that era, the concept of the human 
subjectum reached its apogee.2  
“Sociological” neo-Kantianism during the same period also 
subverted Kant’s claim that the categorical imperative and the 
categories of the understanding are universal features of humanity, 
even amongst those thinkers who were most sympathetic to 
Kantianism in general.3 In neo-Kantianism, “categories” and “moral 
laws” became culturally determined patterns of thinking that happen 
to prevail at this or that particular moment in history amongst this or 
that group of people. As a result of this displacement of the universal 
by the particular, the causes of patterns of thinking 8historical, 
economic, psychological, etc.< not only jutted into prominence, but 
also rendered implausible the claim that any particular cultural 
pattern could constitute an objective, supra-historical ground of truth 
and knowledge. The transcendental subject became the historical 
subject, and philosophical epistemology became the sociology of 
knowledge. Philosophy had lost its “nimbus,” as Wittgenstein put it, 
and painstaking idiographic inquiry into the particular became more 
respectable 8and more fashionable< than starry-eyed nomothetic 
inquiry into the universal.4 
As a result of these trends, “the” human subject 8which human 
subject?< could no longer bear the massive weight of the world in the 
same way that nature and God, the two previous subjecti, had borne 
it. Rather than serving as an absolute and indubitable foundation, the 
human being became a specimen to be studied for its various habits 
and tastes. Science and technology discovered sociology and 
psychology, but lost speculative philosophy. Economic theory 
discovered instrumental rationality based on the probabilistic 
calculation of causes and effects, but gave up all pretence of being a 
science of political economy that is explicitly and unashamedly 
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concerned with the ultimate aims of humanity. 8Habermas, 1984: i. 4< 
In the form of such disciplines as cost-benefit analysis and law-and-
economics, social science abandoned any effort to ground the 
rationality of human choices in anything beyond the sheer existence 
of un-analyzable individual preferences. 
4. 
The previous discussion of the rise and decline of the human 
subjectum shows that tradition has bequeathed us two separate 
grammars for discussing essentially two different types of subjects. I 
will call these the causal subject and the grounding subject. 
The causal subject 8< stands in a relation to the world, conceived of 
as a manifold of things 8< that it keeps on encountering and that it 
must deal with and manage in some way or other. The concept of the 
causal subject thus depicts two distinct entities and their relationship 
8R< to one another: 
R 
This subject is a mover and a shaker. It causes effects in the world, 
and therefore participates fully as a co-citizen, so to speak, in a realm 
that Hegel calls “the causal nexus.” 8Hegel: 1975, 70<  What the causal 
subject’s everyday discourse might call “rationality” or its antithesis 
8e.g. “spirituality”< is always merely epiphenomenal: a product of 
prior experiences and historical influences of which this subject is 
not presently conscious. Moreover, if the causal subject does act in a 
way that it would call “rational,” its comportment is at best 
“instrumentally rational” in Max Weber’s sense of the term. That is, 
the causal subject calculates and uses the object world and other 
human beings as “conditions” or “means” for the attainment of 
certain ends, whatever they may be.1 
The various manifestations of causal subjectivity throughout 
history have been well-nigh infinite in number, as befits the infinite 
causal web in which every human being is caught. However, what 
makes all causal subjects into variations on the same basic theme is 
their utter groundlessness: although their behaviors have causes and 
produce effects, this is the most one can say about them. The causal 
nexus is relentlessly unsentimental and unflattering to human pride: 
it stipulates that today’s cause is always also yesterday’s effect. The 
causal subject is therefore a heteronymous being from top to bottom 
8i.e. fully an effect of history<. Seen from the standpoint of the causal 
subject, X in any form 8e.g. X or “X”< is simply a mute sign—and there 
is no “magic” behind a sign that determines how it is to be applied 
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when the recognition of X “as” X gives way to action in respect of X. 
As Wittgenstein 82005, 52e< suggests, the causal subject does not 
mysteriously “know” 8or pre-know< X so much as simply act with an 
image or impression of X in its mind. 
Phenomenally speaking, “goals” take the form of representations 
8words and images<, and words and images can be interpreted as 
causes that are just as effective as sticks and stones are at breaking 
bones. The so-called “symbolic order” to which the bodies and minds 
of individuals are subjected does not primordially consist of signs-
endowed-with-meanings, for the causal subject does not register 
“meanings” as grounds of action. Rather, the symbolic order shows 
itself first and foremost as a manifold of words and images capable of 
producing effects. As Schopenhauer 81999, 37< put it, at best the 
causal subject’s own mental representations cause its will to turn 
“like a weathervane on a well-oiled pivot in a changeable wind.” 
8Schopenhauer, 1999: 37< This implies that the linguistic expressions 
of what the grounding subject would call “grounds for acting” do not 
in fact provide the causal subject with anything more substantial 
than, say, a momentary burst of adrenaline. After all is said that must 
be said in any given situation, and the time has come to act, the causal 
subject reacts but does not respond to language: it bounces off 
language, so to speak, without answering it back. 
Speaking more generally, one could say that the causal subject not 
only causes things to happen, but also is itself caused. It almost goes 
without saying that a creature such as this is also fated to become an 
object and a means in its own right: an object of scientific inquiry and 
knowledge, for example, and, more generally, a means to the ends of 
other causal subjects. Biology, neuroscience, psychology, sociology, 
anthropology and behavioral economics poke and prod the causal 
subject, trying to find out what really makes it tick beneath all of its 
own flimsy self-interpretations and self-justifications. Various 
technologies of disciplinary power 8family, law, religion, medicine, 
advertising, etc.< also act on the causal subject to make it what it is.1 
In sum, though the causal subject may believe that it autonomously 
uses things and people in its world, whether rationally or otherwise, 
in fact it is also constantly being used by forces beyond its control. 
In contrast to the causal subject, the concept of the grounding 
subject is that of an origin 8archē, in Greek< rather than a mere cause 
8aitia<. The grounding subject is thrown under its world as 8not in< 
an unmediated relation to the projects of its doppelganger, the causal 
subject. The former attempts to authorize or legitimate the 
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instrumentally rational deeds of the latter by freely positing a 
grounding expression 8“X”<: 
8cause< R  
8ground “X”< 
In one respect, at least, the way of thinking called Hegelianism has 
the considerable virtue of highlighting the grounding subject’s own 
attitude towards its grounding expressions. The grounding subject 
believes that the problem of its identity is inextricably linked to the 
coherence and vigor of its ideas.1 The idea, or project, was discovered 
8or invented< by Hegel to avoid falling into what he took to be the 
mind-numbing, soulless abyss of immediacy. According to Hegel’s 
concept of determinate negation 8bestimmte Negation<, the 
consciousness of the human being keeps on freely expressing ideas to 
itself in order to become subordinate to them—that is, in order to let 
the historical progression of its ideas become the dialectical grounds 
8not the causes!< of Spirit’s own self-realization through work and 
knowledge.2 
The grounding subject has shown itself to be a truly protean being 
during the long history of Western thought. It has taken numerous 
historical forms and gone by many different names, including “the 
soul,” “practical freedom,” “Spirit,” “Dasein,” and “existential 
freedom.” In one way or another, the idea of the grounding subject 
in any of its various forms performs its primary task within the 
discursive spheres of politics, law and ethics. The grounding subject 
is supposed to provide a foundation, beyond all merely causal 
relations, that can explain how it is possible for the causal subject at 
once to accomplish something useful in the world and to refute 
Plautus’s notoriously corrosive assertion that “man is wolf to man” 
8Homo homini lupus est<.3 To switch metaphors, the grounding 
subject, like Dr. Jekyll, yearns to make the causal subject, Mr. Hyde, 
at least potentially more worthy and just than a fully determined 
8or over-determined< natural force, such as a pouncing animal or a 
falling boulder. 
Given the foregoing antinomies, the most pressing juridical and 
moral question facing twenty-first century humanity seems to be: 
How can law and politics become at once effective and just, coercive 
and compassionate, responsive and responsible? How, in short, is it 
possible 8to borrow Kant’s somewhat quaint terminology< “to treat 
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man, in your own person as well as in that of anyone else, always as 
an end, never merely as a means?” 8Kant, 1993: 195< 
5.  
How indeed. According to Kant, causes occupy a mere “dwelling 
place” 8domicillium< in nature, whereas rational grounds possess a 
sovereign “realm” 8ditio<.1 The correct meaning of a grounding 
statement seems to put right action on a secure foundation; and the 
activity of grounding seems to be a laudable exercise in human 
reason. A historically conditioned intuitive reaction to the signs 
which express legal norms, on the other hand, is merely causal in 
nature, and causation is something that also happens to lesser beings 
such as rocks, icebergs and alligators. To compare language to a 
mechanism of signs that serves to set off certain reactions in us by 
virtue of previous conditioning and association seems to slander 
reason.2 It appears to degrade autonomous human beings to the 
same level as rocks, icebergs and alligators 8not to mention Pavlov’s 
salivating dogs<, all of which are heteronymous beings incapable of 
transcending their present circumstances on their own.  
Unwilling to be placed on the same level as nature’s other beings, 
conventional legal and political theory believes that its central 
problem is how to attribute right outcomes to grounds rather than 
causes, reason rather than history. John Rawls’s concept of “stability 
for the right reasons”—which he claims to be a necessary condition 
for any realistic liberal conception of justice—furnishes a good 
illustration of this point of view. For Rawls it is not enough that social 
stability is “merely a modus vivendi” produced by contingent 
historical forces: “Stability for the right reasons means stability 
brought about by citizens acting correctly according to the 
appropriate principles of their sense of justice, which they have 
acquired by growing up under and participating in just institutions.” 
8Rawls, 1999: 16, 13 n.2< In other words, although the specific 
contents of particular grounds and reasons may indeed ultimately owe 
their existence to history and its panoply of causal influences, the 
category of right action as such does not. Reason acts on 8as opposed 
to in< history. And the category of right action is defined a priori as 
action that is based on a correct reading, by a grounding subject, of 
historically produced principles that satisfy certain minimal criteria 
of justice. 
 
                                                                            
1. See: Kant, 2000: 10. 
2. See: Wittgenstein and Waismann, 2003: 341 
Peace and Subjectivity / Wolcher      43 
The proposition that law requires the support of rational grounds 
rather than mere historical causes lies at the heart of analytic 
philosophy’s preference for “internal” over “external” explanations of 
the law.1 The internal perspective describes the process of legal 
reasoning from the standpoint of the decider 8usually a judge<, 
whereas “external” thinkers are inclined to attribute justice in 
general, and judicial behaviors in particular, to factors other than the 
objectively correct subjective decisions of legal decision makers to 
accept this or that legal reason 8ground< for their behaviors. Causal 
analysis can unmask the irrational, or at least the pre-theoretical, 
historical factors 8revolutions, invasions, wars, imperialisms, 
genocides, class interests, racisms, patriarchies, etc.< that “illegally” 
found the various forms of domination that exist in every society, and 
that the operations of positive law function to “legally” preserve. The 
fundamental contrast between law-founding and law-preserving 
violence helps explain why Foucault, for example, proposed inverting 
Clausewitz’s notorious proposition that war is the continuation of 
policy by other means to read, quite simply, “politics is the 
continuation of war by other means.” 8Foucault, 2003: 15< Positive law 
equates justice and peace with the business of preserving existing legal 
relations whatever they may be and regardless of any 8lawful< 
asymmetries of power, privilege and prestige they may presuppose 
and perpetuate. 
Methodologically speaking, those who occupy an internal point of 
view are trained to see words that are not calculated means to 
officially-certified 8well-grounded< legal ends as meaningless 
distractions. Such individuals are always impatient to get down to 
what they take to be the real business of the law: correct 
administration by grounding subjects. The imperative of correct 
administration is subverted by the external point of view, which 
insists on talking about what might have been in addition to what 
was, and what might be in addition to what is. Historians, sociologists 
and psychologists 8not to mention Marxists, critical race theorists 
and feminist legal theorists< explain legal norms, arguments and 
outcomes by tracing them to their proximate or ultimate causes 
rather than to their legal grounds, which they suspect of being 
ideological. Seen from the external point of view, the question of a 
juridical result’s rationality cannot be separated from an assessment 
of the rationality 8or irrationality< of its concrete historical origins 
and consequences.  
In its impatience for results, traditional jurisprudence consciously 
                                                                            
1. See: Dworkin, 1986: 13; Hart, 1961: 10. 
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or unconsciously subordinates the ubiquitous brutality and sadness 
of the underlying facts of social life to the necessity of giving them 
legal form. The law is designed to repress awareness of any raw, un-
theorized, “surplus” human suffering so that proper legal grounds 
can be given to manage, explain, and/or justify that suffering’s 
existence. Moreover, what the internal perspective reveals—the 
officially certified “reason” for this or that bit of legalized pain—has 
the effect of concealing that pain from any further scrutiny or notice. 
6. 
It is as if the law greatly feared the monsters that might come if it 
were to fall asleep and risk letting passion and instinct hold sway, as 
in Goya’s famous etching entitled, “The Sleep of Reason Produces 
Monsters” 8El sueño de la razón produce monstruous<. 
But what if there was a sense in which reason is always asleep, 
even when it is most awake? To be more precise, what if the subject-
that-reasons were not one, but two subjects, one of which must 
always fall sleep before the other can awaken? In that event monsters 
might come no matter what actions the well-grounded subject takes, 
and the particular human beings who enforce the law would be like 
Oedipus the King as he stood on the verge of discovering and 
punishing the murderer of Laius: damned if they do, and damned if 
they don’t. 
Nietzsche once said that the great danger of all direct questioning 
of the subject about the subject lies in the fact “that it could be useful and 
important for one’s activity to interpret oneself falsely.” 8Nietzsche, 
1968: 272< This essay has attempted to heed his warning. The strong 
distinction it has drawn between the causal subject and the 
grounding subject is meant to suggest that the most pressing 
philosophical problem pertaining to subjectivity is definitely not how 
it is possible for a metaphysical entity called the subject to break free 
of the given world by using new ideas to overcome old habits. This 
way of thinking begs the question of how new ideas become more 
compelling than the immediacy they would overcome. No, the real 
question concerns what I will call the idea-hood of the idea in relation 
to those who work to implement it. Thinking in terms of passage, the 
problem is not how a symbol-creating entity or milieu—whether we 
call it soul, subject, mind, Spirit, will-to-power, Dasein, Unconscious, 
or anything else—can pass from a historically over-determined 
present 8i.e. the given world< to a different, possibly better, future by 
creating or recognizing new ideas. Rather, the problem is how that-
which-appears in the symbolic sphere makes the passage to its 
subsequent realization. To put the matter even more plainly, the 
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most pressing question is: how it is possible even for the idea of 
something new to found something new? 
7. Conclosion 
The discourse of grounds and grounding conceals a deep 
contradiction or incommensurability between the causal subject and 
the grounding subject, and, in concealing it, testifies to the ethically 
evasive tendencies displayed by all official institutions of law and 
morality. The grounding subject cannot get anything done in the 
world without the assistance of the causal subject. Moreover, it 
cannot communicate with the causal subject except in signs. 
Considered from the grounding subject’s point of view, these signs 
seem to speak in the language of signified meanings 8i.e. rational 
grounds<. But the causal subject can only hear these very same signs 
in a lesser language comprised of mere phonemes that trigger 
historically determined reactions. The very moment the grounding 
subject whispers grounds into the ear of its more muscular twin, the 
causal subject, the former falls asleep, like a narcoleptic, so that the 
latter can react, like Pavlov’s dogs, to the stimulus of the ordinary, the 
run-of-the-mill, the “obvious.” The grounding subject may lay down 
the law as X, but the causal subject always picks up the sign “X” in a 
way that only history can explain. 
The idea of the grounding subject represents a desperate and 
ultimately futile attempt to repress awareness of 8and evade 
personal responsibility for< the essential sadness and tragedy of the 
world. But the idea of the causal subject is also a copout: it reduces 
ethical responsibility to a mere reaction, and thus apologizes for the 
sadness and tragedy of the real world that lies just beneath the 
abstractions of law and morals. The grounding subject hides from 
tragedy behind its grounding expressions; the causal subject rides 
away from tragedy on the back of necessity. The most that thought 
and reason 8the grounding subject< could ever do is provide the 
human body 8the causal subject< with a thin tissue of grounding 
statements made up of symbols and images. But these symbols and 
images will never span the vast existential distance separating the 
grounding subject from the causal subject, our ends from our means, 
our words from our deeds, and, more generally, human suffering and 
all of the seemingly endless casuistries we offer to justify it. Since 
living in constant awareness of this fact can be unpleasant, there is 
always the option of finding refuge in sheer stupidity, which, as 
Vladimir Jankélévitch 82005, 75< once said, is the only way that some 
people have of retaining their innocence. But then again, what if that 
most acerbic of all statements in the Bible—“In much wisdom is 
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much grief; and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow” 
8Ecclesiastes 1:18<—were also the most ethically obligatory? 
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